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The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), a fed-
eral statute of repose,1 has generally been viewed by those in the aircraft
manufacturing industry as an unqualified success.2 Less than fifteen
years after its passage, U.S. aircraft manufacturers, who were once all
but defunct, are now employing large numbers of workers and selling a
sizable number of new light aircraft.3
While it is easy to argue that GARA was both necessary and effec-
tive, it nevertheless has created much frustration for the victims of air-
craft accidents and their attorneys.4 Ambiguities in GARA's language
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1. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000). GARA was enacted in response to widespread financial
distress on the part of general aviation manufacturers. See Press Release, General Aviation Manufac-
turers Association, Ten Years Later - Tort Reform Benefits General Aviation (Feb. 14, 2005),
http://www.gama.aero/mediaCenter/pr.php?id=80 ("Numerous lawsuits, some alleging design flaws
in airplanes that had flown safely for more than 50 years, made liability costs unpredictable, driving
up current product costs and draining research and development resources for future products.").
2. See, e.g., Press Release, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Interview with Robert F. Hedrick, Partner, Hedrick Smith PLLC, and Adjunct Professor,
Seattle Univ. Sch. of Law, in Seattle, Wash. (Sept. 7, 2006).
Seattle University Law Review
have lead to a series of questionable judicial decisions attempting to clar-
ify textual vagaries in the law.5 These decisions have distorted GARA's
application in ways never contemplated by Congress.6 Further, the lan-
guage used in GARA's final draft gave it a substantially different scope
than was contemplated during congressional hearings on the legislation.7
For passengers injured in aircraft accidents, owners of property
damaged by an aircraft, and buyers and sellers of refurbished aircraft,
GARA may shift liability in ways never discussed or even anticipated
during the congressional hearings. An injured individual's otherwise
valid claim should not be statutorily denied in the absence of a delibera-
tive legislative process. Instead, claim limitations under GARA are often
an unintended consequence. GARA, then, is a statute in great need of a
congressional tuneup.
This Comment will examine the congressional intent that shaped
GARA, evaluate the equitable implications of the statute's drafting lan-
guage, discuss its significant judicial interpretations, and explore the au-
thor's recommendations aimed at minimizing GARA's inequities with-
out negating its positive aspects. Part II begins with an analysis of
GARA's legislative history, identifies stakeholders and their arguments,
and examines issues given insufficient consideration by Congress. Part
III assesses how GARA actually affected the aviation market when com-
pared to the stakeholders' predictions. Part IV will survey a selection of
important judicial decisions interpreting GARA. Finally, Part V evalu-
ates the inequities created by the statute and offers recommendations that
will remedy those inequities.
II. HISTORY OF GARA
This Part examines the arguments that led to GARA, how the aims
of the interested parties were shaped during the congressional hearings,
how the statute's drafting became the source of one of its major inequi-
ties, and how critical issues surrounding GARA's application were not
scrutinized. First, GARA's background, including aviation manufactur-
ers' alleged need for immunization against liability, will be examined.
Next, the stakeholders behind the enactment of GARA and their particu-
lar interests will be identified. Third, the Part explains how changes in
GARA's draft language expanded its coverage far beyond the scope con-
templated in congressional debates. Finally, the Part evaluates GARA's
alleged necessity.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Parts IV-V.
7. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Legislative History and Intent
In the early 1980s, general aviation 8 manufacturers began to lobby
congressional representatives from Kansas for statutory relief from the
yoke of unlimited product liability. In 1994, over a decade of such lobby-
ing paid off, and President Clinton signed GARA into law. 9
The driving force behind GARA was the failure of the U.S. piston-
powered aircraft market.' 0 U.S. general aviation aircraft production had
declined from 18,000 units in 1978 to only 928 units in 1994.1 The
Cessna Aircraft Company, which has sold more civilian piston-powered
single-engine aircraft than any other company in history,12 completely
shut down its single-engine production lines in 1986.13 Industry analysts
estimated that this decline resulted in the loss of approximately 100,000
jobs. 14 These numbers stood in stark contrast to those of other segments
of the aerospace industry, where the U.S. market share remained strong.
In particular, the United States remained a world leader in the production
and sale of business jets. 15
Manufacturers unanimously cited the cost of settling, defending
against, and insuring against litigation as the ultimate cause of the failure
in this segment of the aerospace market, which had, until recently, been
dominated by the United States. 16 Beech Aircraft Company, for example,
defended itself against 203 accident suits filed between 1983 and 1986
and reported that its average cost per case was $530,000.17 Yet according
to the National Transportation Safety Board, not one of these accidents
was attributable to manufacturing and design defects. '
8
8. The term "general aviation" can be defined as the subset of aircraft not used for public,
military, or scheduled commercial use. DICTIONARY OF AERONAUTICAL TERMS 238-39 (Dale Crane
ed., 3d ed. 1997). The term may also collectively refer to small private aircraft. See infra Part II.C.
9. See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 1458, 30 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1678 (Aug. 22, 1994).
10. See supra note 1. In the author's experience, piston-powered single-engine light aircraft are
generally two- to six-seat, owner-flown planes that weigh less than 4,000 pounds loaded, fly at a
speed of 80 to 200 miles per hour, and arc powered by reciprocating gasoline-powered engines with
four to six cylinders and no more than 300 horsepower.
11. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-0I-916, GENERAL AVIATION STATUS
OF THE INDUSTRY, RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SAFETY ISSUES 24 (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01916.pdf.
12. In its eighty-year history, Cessna has produced more than 152,000 single-engine piston
aircraft. The 7000th Single-Engine Piston Aircraft Is Built at Independence, AVBUYER,
http://www.avbuyer.com/Articles/Article.asp?ld=547.
13. Ken Vandruff, Cessna Delivers 5,000th Single-Engine Piston Airplane, WICHITA BUS. J.,
Mar. 25, 2004, http://wichita.bizjournals.com/wichitalstories/2004/03/22/daily3 1 .html.
14. 140 CONG. REC. S2438, S2438-39 (1994).
15. Id. at S2442.
16. Id. at S2438-39.
17. Id. at S2441.
18. Id.
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GARA is a statute of repose that, with certain exceptions, bars a
lawsuit against any manufacturer of a general aviation aircraft for design
and manufacturing defects, if the accident leading to the cause of action
occurred more than eighteen years after the aircraft was first delivered
from the factory. 19 In the case of parts manufacturers, GARA sets the
start of the repose period as the date that a part was first installed on an
aircraft.
20
A statute of repose is very different from a statute of limitations,
which limits claims based on the time elapsed after the occurrence of the
incident in question.21 With a statute of repose, the clock typically starts
ticking on the delivery date of the product that is later alleged to be de-
fective. 22 The policy behind such statutes is that, without proper mainte-
nance, manufactured items will deteriorate over time; thus, after a certain
point, owners should inherit responsibility from manufacturers when
maintaining these older products.23
For a manufacturer to qualify for GARA protection, the aircraft in-
volved in the accident must satisfy three requirements. First, it must be a
general aviation aircraft, meaning that it must have been issued a type
certificate or airworthiness certificate before the accident occurred.24
Second, the aircraft must have been originally certificated for no more
than twenty seats. Finally, the aircraft must not be engaged in scheduled
passenger carriage at the time of the accident.25
Four exceptions apply to GARA's provisions. GARA will not pro-
tect manufacturers if (1) it is proven that the manufacturer knowingly
misrepresented, or concealed or withheld, required information relating
to a dangerous condition regarding an aircraft or part, and that condition
was causally related to the accident; (2) the deceased or injured claimant
was on board the aircraft because of a medical or other emergency; (3)
19.49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000).
20. Id. § 2(a)(2).
21. See Wikipedia, Statute of limitations, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute of limitations
(last visited May 11, 2008).
22. See Statute of Repose,
http://www.colorado.edu/engineering/civil/db/DBS/glossary.cgi?word=Statute+of+Repose (last
visited May 11, 2008).
23. National Association of Manufacturers, Statute of Repose,
http://www.nam.org/s_nam/docl.asp?CID=453&DID=225290 (last visited May 11, 2008).
24. § 2(c). Civil aircraft may not be flown without a valid airworthiness certificate. 14 C.F.R. §
91.203(a)(1) (2007). The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration will issue a type
certificate to an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance when he or she finds that it is prop-
erly designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets certain other regulations and mini-
mum standards. 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1) (2000).
25. § 2(c).
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the claimant was not onboard the aircraft; or (4) the deceased or injured
26party's claim sounds in contract pursuant to a written warranty.
B. The Stakeholders
The most important groups advocating for the enactment of GARA
were (1) Kansas politicians, led by Senator Nancy Kassebaum; 27 (2) the
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) 28, most notably
represented by Russ Meyer, Chairman and CEO of Cessna; (3) the Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union
(IAM); and (4) the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA). The
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) 29 was the primary or-
ganizer of opposition to GARA's enactment.30
Senator Kassebaum and Representative Dan Glickman were the
congressional sponsors of GARA, championing its passage for roughly
ten years. 3' Aviation manufacturing interests represent a major constitu-
ency for Kansas politicians because the aerospace industry is one of the
largest and most important employment sectors in Kansas.32 Supporters
focused on the importance of general aviation to the U.S. economy and
trade balance-the bill was advanced as a means to recreate lost jobs at
"no cost" 33-as well as the support revitalized general aviation would
provide to commercial aviation, through the provision of a training
ground for future pilots. 34 Supporters noted that the lack of a federal stat-
ute of repose for the U.S. aviation industry put it at a competitive disad-
vantage globally because most European countries already had statutes
26. § 2(b).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 103-883, at 73 (1995).
28. GAMA represents the interests of manufacturers such as Cessna, Piper Aircraft, Hawker
Beechcraft, Lycoming Engines, Teledyne Continental Motors, Bombardier Aerospace, Dassault
Falcon Jet, and Pratt & Whitney Canada. General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Media
Guide,
http://www.gama.aero/mediaCenter/mediaGuide/companies.php (last visited May 11, 2008).
29. ATLA is now known as the American Association for Justice. American Association for
Justice, http://www.atlanet.org/ (last visited May 11, 2008).
30. 140 CONG. REC. S2438, S2443 (1994).
31. See H.R. REP. No. 103-883, at 73.
32. Kansas is the nationwide hub for light aircraft manufacturing in the United States. It is
home to production facilities for Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, Airbus/North American Wing
Design, Cessna, Hawker Beechcraft, Bombardier Aerospace, and Spirit AeroSystems, as well as
numerous manufacturing companies that support the production efforts of these companies. Wings
Over Kansas Aviation Employment Resource Page, http://www.wingsoverkansas.com/careers/ (last
visited May 11, 2008).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 103-525(11), at 6-7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644.
34. GEN. AVIATION MFRS. ASS'N, FIVE YEAR RESULTS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS ON THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT (1999), available at
http://www.gama.aero/pubs/getFile.php?cataloglD=l 1.
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of repose in effect, commonly with limitation periods of only ten years.35
By eliminating this domestically imposed restriction on trade, manufac-
turers could reenter the market competitively and recapture their lost
market share from their European competitors. 36
GAMA was a powerful industry advocate of GARA enactment.
This organization of aircraft manufacturers represented the largest single
group of businesses that would directly benefit from the passage of a
statute of repose. GAMA members argued that the money spent insuring
and defending against lawsuits was money that could be spent on re-
search and development for the benefit of the industry.37 A belief that
tort liability was hindering technological advances and delaying or pre-
venting safety improvements in general aviation was prevalent among
pilots. 38 The oppressiveness of this liability made it difficult for manu-
facturers to obtain insurance for design or product defects-one Lloyd's
of London underwriter dryly commented at the time that Lloyd's was
prepared to insure aviation risks, but not the risks of the American legal
system. 39
The most noteworthy GAMA proponent was Russell Meyer, who
gave extended testimony on the nature of the demise of general aviation
in the United States, the shutdown of Cessna's piston-powered aircraft
production lines, and his pledge to bring piston aircraft back into produc-
tion at Cessna should a statute of repose be enacted.40
The second influential industry proponent of GARA was the IAM.
Much of the congressional testimony focused on the 100,000 lost jobs
35. See Council Directive 85/374, On the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Admin-
istrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, art. 11, 1985
O.J. (L 210) 29 (EC).
36. See The General Aviation Revitalization Act: Hearing on H.R. 3087 and S. 1458 Before the
Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 41-53
(1994) (statement of Russell W. Meyer, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cessna Aircraft Company), avail-
able at 1994 WL 233059.
37. See, e.g., Preservation and Promotion of General Aviation Airports: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Transportation and Infrastructure Comm., 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Edward M. Bolen, President, GAMA), available at 1999 WL 377376; cf Timothy S.
McAllister, A "Tail" ofLiability Reform: General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 & the General
Aviation Industry in the United States, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 301, 316 (1995) (explaining that GARA
could free up industry money for research and development investment in new and old piston-engine
general aviation aircraft).
38. James F. Rodriguez, Tort Reform & GARA: Is Repose Incompatible with Safety?, 47 ARIZ.
L. REV. 577, 591-92 (2005).
39. Id. at 579.
40. H.R. REP. NO. 103-525(11), at 6-7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644. True to
his word, one day after the passage of GARA, Meyer confirmed that Cessna would restart some of
its single-engine aircraft production lines. The grand opening of a new single-engine manufacturing
facility in Independence, Kansas, occurred on July 3, 1996. General Aviation Revitalization Act
Panel Discussion, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 169, 171 (1997) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
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linked to the decline in general aviation manufacturing. 4  On behalf of
the IAM, John Goglia speculated that without the passage of GARA, job
rates and productivity would soon decline even further.42
The most vocal consumer group in favor of a statute of repose was
the AOPA.4 3 Interestingly, its members represent the most obvious group
of people who would have their claims barred by a statute of repose.
44
One pilot described the AOPA position on GARA as "a delicate balance
for AOPA members; they wanted fair compensation for victims of faulty
products and at the same time, they wanted reasonable prices. '45 The
AOPA negotiated this balance by endorsing a repose period of twenty
years instead of the industry-preferred twelve-year period.46 Ultimately,
the groups settled on an eighteen-year repose period.4 7
The lobby opposing GARA was somewhat harder to identify.
48
Most sources cite ATLA as the sole group opposed to GARA.49
41. See, e.g., The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 1458 Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong.
(1993) (statement of Russell W. Meyer, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cessna Aircraft Company), avail-
able at 1993 WL 747632. This figure was cited repeatedly throughout the hearings; its accuracy,
however, has been questioned. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Anton, A Critical Evaluation of the General
Aviation Revitalization Act of1994, 63 J. AIR L. & COM 759, 807-08 (1998).
42. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993: Hearing Before the Economic and Commer-
cial Law Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 68-74 (1994) (statement of John
Goglia, Member, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers), available at
1994 WL 233073.
43. See The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Economic and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 54-68 (1994)
(statement of Phil Boyer, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association), available at 1994 WL
233066.
44. It is a pilot's family members (who were represented only by ATLA at the GARA hear-
ings), and not the pilot him- or herself, who would likely face the difficult prospect of recovering
damages under GARA. Interview with Franklin L. Smith, Partner, Hedrick Smith PLLC, in Seattle,
Wash. (Sept. 7, 2006). Moreover, because GARA has shifted the target of litigation recovery from
aircraft manufacturers to local maintenance organizations, flight schools, and the owner's own insur-
ance policies, rising insurance costs for these new targets have threatened "grass roots" aviation.
Interview with Robert F. Hedrick, supra note 4. In fact, "some aircraft maintenance and repair facili-
ties [are] turning away aircraft older than 18 years of age because of insurance and liability concerns
and because that age puts the aircraft beyond the statute of repose limits established in [GARA]."
Yingling Aviation Welcomes Older Aircraft, AVIATION MAINTENANCE, Mar. 1, 2007, at 9, available
at http://www.aviationtoday.com/am/categories/maintenance/8926.html; see also infra Part IlI.B..
45. Nathan A. Ferguson, Surviving an Industry Nightmare: The Commercial Insurance Crisis
Hits Home, AOPA PILOT MAG., Mar. 2001, http://aopa2.org/pilot/features/200 l/feat0 I 03.html?PF.
46. Id.
47.49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § (3)(3) (2000).
48. Witnesses testifying in opposition to the enactment of GARA chose not to identify them-
selves as being members of any particular organization. See Timothy S. McAllister, A "Tail" of
Liability Reform: GeneralAviation Revitalization Act of 1994 & the GeneralAviation Industry in the
United States, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 301, 309 (1995) (stating that ATLA chose not to participate in the
hearings in an official capacity).
49. E.g. 140 CONG. REC. S2438, 52441 (1994).
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Although ATLA did not present testimony under its own name at the
hearings, it did organize witnesses who gave testimony regarding aircraft
accidents where the victims' otherwise viable claims would have been
barred by the proposed statute of repose.5o
Witnesses also argued that GARA should not be characterized as a
"no cost" job program, but should more accurately be described as an
industry subsidy-paid for by the victims of aircraft accidents. 51 Dam-
ages, the argument goes, will ultimately be paid by some segment of so-
ciety, and a just legal system will lay the burden on those most responsi-
ble and best able to bear the cost. Thus, denying victims compensation
from manufacturers of faulty products will not further the interests of a
just society, even if such denial results in the creation ofjobs.
Critics of GARA were at a distinct disadvantage when trying to
discredit the proponents' optimistic projections. GARA supporters could
cite the sales and employment statistics generated during the 1970s, ar-
guably the golden years of general aviation, thereby implying that sales
and employment numbers would return to these levels under the new
GARA regime. 52 The critics, however, were left with the difficult task of
trying to concretely explain why production resurgence was unlikely to
happen. There was little that critics could offer to persuasively show that
the advocates' numbers were overly optimistic, beyond their opinions
that times had changed and that there was no longer such a robust market
for light aircraft.
GARA opponents did manage to give particularly potent testimony
regarding how latent design defects could remain hidden beyond the re-
pose period, thereby allowing a negligent manufacturer to avoid account-
ability for any resulting deaths. The most powerful testimony described
53the history surrounding the infamous Beechcraft V-tail Bonanza, an
aircraft that incorporated a design flaw in its novel tail which resulted in
a structural in-flight failure rate "twenty-four times higher" than its
"straight tail" cousins.54 Over a period of more than twenty years, almost
50. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
51. Panel Discussion, supra note 40, at 184-85.
52. See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 1458, 30 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1678 (Aug. 22, 1994).
53. Limiting Liability for Small Aircrafts: Hearing Before the Economic and Commercial Law
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 119-30 (1994) [hereinafter Stearman
Hearing] (statement of Ronald 0. Stearman, Professor in Engineering, The University of Texas at
Austin), available at 1994 WIL 233061.
54. The "twenty-four times higher" assertion was the subject of much debate during litigation
involving the V-Tail. Beechcraft lawyers argued that the V-tail was really "only" eight times more
likely to break up in flight, and that the accident disparity between the two models was actually due
to the unusually safe design of the straight-tail Bonanza design. See generally Kurt Hoover & Wal-
lace T. Fowler, The University of Texas at Austin, Texas Space Grant Consortium, Studies in Ethics,
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250 V-tails experienced fatal in-flight breakups. 55 Beechcraft representa-
tives continually denied the existence of a design flaw, instead claiming
56the accidents resulted from pilot error. In the end, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD)57 that
mandated the addition of structural supports to the tail section of the en-
tire V-tail fleet, virtually ending the structural failures. 58 In the case of
the V-tails, opponents contended, a statute of repose could have wrong-
fully denied the victims' families rightful recovery from those responsi-
ble for their injuries.59
C. Confusion over the Definition of "General Aviation"
Ironically, one of the least discussed issues during the congressional
hearings was which aircraft GARA would ultimately cover. Throughout
the hearings, most testimony reflected an assumption that GARA was
conceived to give relief solely to the light, piston-powered, single-engine
market.60 The bill that was eventually signed into law, however, covered
far more than that small segment of the aviation market.61
The term "general aviation" can have two very distinct meanings in
the aviation community. In a legal sense, "general aviation" "describes
any aircraft other than a military or scheduled airline flight, ranging from
gliders to large, non-scheduled cargo jets."62 Informally, "general avia-
tion" can also connote the much smaller subset of civil aviation aircraft
that is typified by the light, piston-powered, single-engine aircraft, typi-
cally flown by its owner (or a renter), primarily for pleasure.63
During the legislative hearings, witnesses and sponsors almost ex-
clusively relied on the more narrow definition of "general aviation.
', 64
Safety, and Liability for Engineers, http://www.tsgc.utexas.edu/archive/general/ethics/vtail.html (last
visited May 11, 2008).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. An AD is a regulatory notice issued by the FAA that informs operators of possible unsafe
conditions that may be present in aircraft and prescribes mandatory steps to address the issues. 14
C.F.R. § 39.3-.11 (2007).
58. Airworthiness Directives; Beech Aircraft Corporation 35 Series Airplanes, 59 Fed. Reg.
49,785-02 (Sept. 30, 1994).
59. Stearman Hearing, supra note 53.
60. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S2438 (1994).
61. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § (2)(c) (2000).
62. DICTIONARY OF AERONAUTICAL TERMS, supra note 8, at 238.
63. See, e.g., Press Release, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, General Aviation and
Homeland Security (Jan. 23, 2004),
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2002/020621_homeland-security.html ("More than 70%
of the [general aviation] fleet are small, single-engine aircraft with six or fewer seats.").
64. E.g. H.R. REP. NO. 103-525(11), at 6-7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644
(statement of Cessna CEO Meyer that "[i]f we don't get this legislation it [production of piston
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Yet mysteriously, the drafters used the much more expansive definition
when the bill was finally approved. 65 By defining "general aviation air-
craft" as any aircraft originally66 type-certificated for nineteen passen-
gers or less, not engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations,
Congress immunized an enormous segment of manufacturers against
liability.67 For instance, because GARA did not mention the type of air-
craft known as powerplant, virtually every manufacturer of business jets
qualifies for GARA protection.68 The enactment of this broader language
was an incredible stroke of fortune for manufacturers. For example, in
the case of Textron, the parent company of Cessna, Lycoming Aircraft
Engines, and Bell Helicopter, the scope of the liability limitation now
extended beyond just the piston-powered line of Cessna single-engine
aircraft, to include the entire range of Cessna business jets, as well as
Bell Helicopter's complete line of civil rotorcraft-a result never debated
during the hearings.69
D. Was Unfettered Liability Really the
Cause of General Aviation's Decline?
Another area only minimally explored during the hearings was
whether the downturn in piston-powered light aircraft manufacturing was
purely the result of extraordinary litigation costs, or whether there were
other market factors at work. Because turbine-powered business aircraft
were changing the face of the aviation market at the time, it was an open
question whether the proposed legislation would have the desired effect
of revitalizing the light plane industry. 70 The incorporation of ever more
complex technology has resulted in revolutionary transformations in the
civil aviation market; the costs associated with these technological
aircraft] is all academic. We are not going to go back into production of single engine aircraft. We
will stay building jets and build turbine aircraft where that is not a factor.").
65. Mr. Meyer apparently had a hand in the actual drafting of the final version of the bill. Na-
than J. Rice, Comment, The General Aviation Revitalization Act Of1994: A Ten-Year Retrospective,
2004 Wis. L. REV. 945, 969.
66. See infra Part IV.C.
67. See Panel Discussion, supra note 40 (76% of all general aviation aircraft were immunized
upon GARA's passage).
68. Only a few exceptionally large business jets fall outside of GARA's coverage. For exam-
ple, Gulfstream's 550 business jet, a turbine-powered aircraft that weighs 90,000 pounds, flies at an
approximate speed of 550 miles per hour, has a range of more than 6,500 miles, and costs more than
$35 million, would be covered by GARA in its typical interior configuration.
69. Bell Helicopter received an additional windfall following the Kennedy decision. See infra
Part IV.A.
70. See Anton, supra note 41, at 795 (arguing that GARA simply freed up industry funds that
could be used to produce more profitable turbine and jet aircraft rather than to restart the production
of light piston aircraft).
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advances could have been a major factor in the decline in the U.S. light
plane market.
Until the 1960s, aircraft operated for business purposes were almost
exclusively piston-powered. 71 With the advent of affordable, turbine-
powered engines suitable for small- and mid-size aircraft, buyers who
would have purchased a piston-powered aircraft by necessity now have
the option of purchasing a turbo-prop or jet aircraft that can fly higher,
farther, and faster. Purchasers often justify the increased cost of these
aircraft by the increased utility they provide.72 Turboprop aircraft are
more reliable than piston-powered aircraft; moreover, they are faster by a
wide margin; haul more weight; fly higher; and offer a smoother, quieter
ride, greater safety, and more prestige.73 Jet aircraft offer performance
that is even better than the turbo-props. 74 This market change could con-
ceivably have been just as responsible for the decline in the American
light plane market as was unfettered product liability.
75
Another important factor to consider when evaluating the changes
that occurred in the light aircraft market during the 1980s was the prolif-
eration of more advanced avionics.7 6 Progress in air navigation was the
result of not only more reliable engines and more capable airframes but
also better navigation, communication, weather monitoring, and collision
avoidance equipment. These improved electronic accessories, however,
elevated the costs of newer aircraft exponentially over earlier-generation
aircraft.77 For example, in 1958, the base model Cessna 172 sold for
$8,995,78 or $66,337.25 when corrected for inflation.79 In contrast, a base
71. One of the first turboprop business aircraft brought to market, the Gulfstream I, was put
into production in the mid-1950s. The first small jet aircraft produced on a mass scale was the Lear-




72. Justifying Private Jets for Business, CNN.cOM, Feb. 6, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TRAVEL/02/02/bt.business.jets/index.html.
73. See AirCharterGuide.com, Aircraft Choices,
http://www.aircharterguide.com/AircraftTypes.aspx (last visited May 11, 2008).
74. Id.
75. See Guillemette, supra note 71.
76. Avionics is defined as "the branch of technology that deals with the design, production,
installation, use, and servicing of electronic equipment mounted in aircraft." DICTIONARY OF
AERONAUTICAL TERMS, supra note 8, at 47. In this Comment, the term is used to refer to the inte-
grated electronic equipment of an aircraft.
77. Today, the cost of an aircraft's avionics can exceed the cost of the airframe and engine
combined.
78. Wikipedia.com, Cessna 172, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cessna_172 (last visited May 11,
2008).
79. Tom's Inflation Calculator, http://www.halfhill.com/inflation.html (last visited May 11,
2008).
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model 2007 Cessna 172R Skyhawk, the least expensive aircraft Cessna
now sells, currently lists for $234,500.80 Adding four factory avionics
upgrades to an already impressive avionics suite can increase that price
to approximately $260,000.81 This dramatic increase in entry level cost
could also have had seriously depressed aircraft sales; thus, technology
costs, not product liability costs, might have been the driving force be-
hind the economic downturn that created the impetus for GARA.
Manufacturers, of course, claimed that prices were climbing chiefly
due to the oppressive cost of liability insurance, not because of the more
advanced equipment being integrated into newer aircraft.82 The manufac-
turers, however, refused to disclose their insurance costs to Congress.
Instead, Congress was asked to take the actual cost of manufacturers'
liability insurance premiums on faith.83 When asked directly what
Cessna's insurance costs were, CEO Russ Meyer responded that actual
costs were a corporate secret and disclosure of this sensitive information
would put the company at a competitive disadvantage.84 Mr. Meyer did
say, however, that Cessna was self-insured for the first $30 million of
any claim. 85 An unfortunate side effect of the nondisclosure of actual
manufacturer insurance premiums was that Congress was denied the
most direct measure of the ultimate effectiveness of GARA. If manufac-
turers' insurance costs have decreased post-GARA, the statute's costs
cannot be balanced against its benefits.
III. GARA iN HINDSIGHT
This Part will examine how the arguments made by GARA's pro-
ponents and opponents have fared after the passage of more than a dec-
ade. The first Section will focus on the proponent's arguments, while the
second will examine the arguments made by GARA's opponents and
whether these latter voices have any legitimate claims in light of the re-
bound of the U.S. light plane market after GARA.
80. 2008 172R Skyhawk Price List,
http://se.cessna.com/pdfpricing/l72RSkyhawkPricelist_Equipment.pdf (last visited May 11,
2008).
81. Id. (adding the following optional equipment: TAWS-B Terrain, ADF KR87, DME KN63,
and C406N).
82. See 140 CONG. REc. S3006, S3007 (1994) (Sen. Danforth citing Beechcraft's estimation
that litigation costs added $70,000 to the price of each new aircraft); John H. Boswell & George
Andrew Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry: Putting Tort Reform to the Test, 60 J. AIR L. &
COM. 533, 537 (1995).
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A. The Proponent's Arguments
When aviation manufacturing advocates evaluate the effects of the
GARA tort reform experiment, one success almost universally attributed
to the its passage is the reopening of the Cessna piston aircraft produc-
tion line. 86 Just as Russ Meyer promised, with the end of the indefinite
product liability, Cessna restarted its production of single-engine piston
aircraft.87 Only two years after GARA was signed into law, the first new
88Cessna 172R rolled off the assembly line in Independence, Kansas.
Production numbers have approached the industry predictions given dur-
ing the hearings. As of 2005, U.S. piston-engine production had climbed
to 2,024 units, almost precisely the amount Cessna predicted it would
sell within five years of GARA's passage.89
Proponents of GARA were also successful in predicting the job
growth the statute would stimulate. The General Accounting Office esti-
mates 25,000 new jobs have been created, precisely the number predicted
at the hearings. Few could point to these statistics as being anything less
than an unqualified indication of GARA's success.
B. The Opponent's Arguments
In spite of the vindication that GARA's advocates may claim, the
voices in opposition to GARA were also largely accurate in their predic-
tions as well. The savings that the manufacturers were to reap had to
come from somewhere. GARA was supposed to shift the risks of light
aircraft production from manufacturers to operators and maintenance
organizations, which, after eighteen years of using, maintaining, and
modifying the manufacturers' products, arguably deserved a larger pro-
portion of liability for accidents. 90 GARA may have been costless, as far
as requiring expenditures from Congress, but removing the manufacturer
as the primary target of most aircraft accident litigation has changed the
landscape for plaintiffs dramatically. Now, parts manufacturers have be-
come "the new deep pockets" for suits involving GARA-protected air-
craft. 91 Maintenance organizations, fixed base operators, 92 flight schools,
86. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 40, at 171.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. GEN. AVIATION MFRS. ASS'N, 2007 GENERAL AVIATION STATISTICAL DATABOOK &
INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 16 (2007), available at
http://www.gama.aero/events/air/dloads/2007GAMADatabookOutlook.pdf. Additionally, the events
of September 11, 2001, together with the economic downturn that followed, must be taken into
consideration when evaluating general aviation's comeback.
90. 140 CONG. REc. H4998, H4999 (1994) (statement of Rep. Fish).
91. Phillip J. Kolczynski, GARA: A Status Report, AVWEB, Jan. 14, 2001,
http://www.avweb.com/news/avlaw/181905- .html.
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and owner's insurance policies and assets are also new targets for plain-
tiffs in accident litigation. 93 As a result, insurance premiums for these
segments of the aviation community have risen dramatically.94 Over the
past ten years, for example, some flight schools have reported roughly a
threefold increase in their insurance costs. 95 For businesses with tight
profit margins, like flight schools, these added costs threaten their very
existence. 96 Plaintiffs will also face situations where adequate recovery
may be very difficult, especially in cases alleging wrongful death, be-
cause most small aircraft insurance policies are exhausted long before the
claims are satisfied.
97
In the end, then, it is difficult to say that GARA was a complete
success or a complete failure. The answer probably lies somewhere in
between. The light aircraft manufacturing industry has experienced a
dramatic recovery, close to the levels anticipated by GARA's proponents
during the hearings. 98 Yet the costs of purchasing, operating, and main-
taining these new aircraft have continued to rise, pushing a once-feasible
aspiration of a middle-income family, purchasing a new piston-powered
aircraft, out of the realm of reality.99 Without a doubt, the advanced tech-
nology promised by the manufacturers after GARA's passage is also
having a dramatic effect on the costs of new aircraft. 100 Advents like the
owner-flown very light jet' 01 mark the first viable intersection of jet
technology with small personal aircraft, signaling a new age in personal
air transportation, albeit only for the wealthiest consumers. 102 Ultimately,
it may not be possible to say whether the post-GARA light aircraft mar-
ket boom was actually created by GARA, or if this result in fact had little
92. A fixed base operator is a retail firm that sells general aviation products or services at an
airport. Avjobs.com, Airport FBO Jobs, http://www.avjobs.com/careers/detail.asp?ReclD=47 (last
visited May 12, 2008).
93. Interview with Robert F. Hedrick, supra note 4.
94. See Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 598.
95. See id
96. For example, the former owner of a flight school, at which the author once trained, now
only provides instruction in aircraft provided by his students, solely because of oppressive insurance
premiums.
97. Can Aircraft Owners Avoid Personal Liability for Air Crashes?, AVIATION L. NEWSL.
(Phillip J. Kolczynski Law Corp., L.A., Cal.), Sept. 1998,
http://www.aviationlawcorp.com/content/newsltr3.html.
98. Press Release, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, supra note 1.
99. See supra Part II.D.
100. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
101. Very light jets generally weigh less than 10,000 pounds and are certified for single-pilot
operation. Wikipedia, Very light jet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verylight jet (last visited May
12, 2008).
102. See David Collogan, Cessna Targets Entry-Level Market with Mustang, SHOWNEWS
ONLINE, http://www.aviationweek.com/shownews/02nbaa/topsto2_20.htm (pricing Cessna's new
"entry-level" very light jet at approximately $2.3 million).
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to do with manufacturer liability, but instead was caused by the numer-
ous factors at work in this complex market.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF GARA
One of the measures that any thorough evaluation of GARA must
include is the statute's cost to society. Though it did not affect the federal
budget, GARA had a huge effect on at least one class of citizens-
litigants. 103 With its passage, Congress rewrote the book on case strategy
for both plaintiffs and defendants. Nowhere is this effect seen more
clearly than in decisions where courts have acted to clarify and define the
actual scope, meaning, and application of GARA.
In this Part, three cases will be examined. First, Estate of Kennedy
v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. 104 discusses the controversial role the
issuance date of an aircraft's type certificate plays regarding GARA ap-
plicability and is critical in clarifying how certain elements of GARA
should be interpreted in the Ninth Circuit. Second, Hiser v. Bell Helicop-
ter Textron Inc. 10 5 analyzes the effect on the GARA repose period when
elements of an aircraft's systems are replaced with new parts or the sys-
tem is reconfigured by movement of the original parts. Finally, Croman
Corp. v. GE Co. 106 examines what an "original" airworthiness certificate
actually is.
A. Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.
Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. is a Ninth Circuit
case concerning the fatal crash of a TH-1L helicopter involved in quick-
turnaround, heavy-lift logging operations. 107 The accident occurred when
the aircraft experienced a catastrophic structural failure at treetop level
while carrying a heavy load of timber slung underneath the aircraft.10 8
The proximate cause of the failure was fatigue-induced cracking of the
left-hand forward spar of the vertical fin of the tail boom, the structure
which supports the aircraft's tail rotor assembly. 109
103. Interview with Robert F. Hedrick, supra note 4.
104. 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
105. 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
106. No. 2:05-cv-0575-GEB-JFM, 2006 WL 3201099 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006).
107. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1109. Helicopter logging involves the lifting of cut logs from inac-
cessible areas like steep slopes onto logging trucks. Interview with Franklin L. Smith, supra note 44.
108. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1109.
109. Id. One critical purpose of the tail rotor is to counteract the torque of the main rotor.
DICTIONARY OF AERONAUTICAL TERMS, supra note 8, at 502. Without this offsetting force, the hull
of the helicopter would freely rotate in the opposite direction of the rotor. If more power is added to
the main rotor, an equivalent amount of antitorque force must be added with the tail rotor. Every-
thing2, Helicopter yaw control (May 29, 2003),
http://everything2.com/e2node/Helicopter/2520yaw%2520control. In heavy-lift situations, the
Seattle University Law Review
Bell delivered the helicopter in question to the Navy in 1970 as a
public aircraft. 10 In 1984, the Navy declared the aircraft surplus; Garlick
Helicopters Inc., an organization that specializes in refurbishing ex-
military helicopters for heavy-lift operations, ultimately purchased it.11'
In 1986, the aircraft successfully completed a conformity check' 12 con-
ducted by the FAA and was issued its first airworthiness certificate." 3
The crash occurred ten years later. 114
The question presented in Kennedy was when the repose period be-
gan to run in the case of a public aircraft delivered without an airworthi-
ness certificate yet in possession of one at the time of the accident. 115
GARA covers only "general aviation" aircraft, i.e., those that have at one
time been issued an airworthiness certificate, where the original certifi-
cate indicates the aircraft has less than twenty passenger seats, and where
the aircraft is not carrying scheduled passengers at the time of the acci-
dent. 16 According to the Kennedy court, the statutory language of
GARA indicates that the eighteen-year period should begin to run at the
aircraft's delivery to its first owner, even if the aircraft was not yet le-
gally a part of the general aviation fleet. 117 The statutory period, the court
said, looks back to the aircraft's first delivery date, as long as the aircraft
in question is part of the general aviation fleet at the time the accident
118occurs.
Thus, according to the Kennedy decision, an aircraft manufacturer
has no real control over future GARA applicability to any aircraft it
manufactures without an airworthiness certificate, e.g., public aircraft.
GARA protection will ultimately be determined not only by the elapsed
time between the date of the aircraft's delivery and the accident, but also
loads carried by the fin and tail boom assemblies are considerable. Adding to the stress that the fin
spar must endure is the heavy cycling inherent in helicopter logging, where loads are lifted and
dropped many times per hour. These load cycles eventually cause work hardening, which reduces
the structural integrity of the fim spar. This work hardening effect can be simply demonstrated by
repeatedly bending a paperclip until it snaps.
110. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112. A public aircraft is defined as an aircraft used only in gov-
ernmental service; govemment-owned aircraft engaged in carrying persons or property for commer-
cial purposes fall outside of the definition. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2007).
111. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1111; Interview with Franklin L. Smith, supra note 44.
112. A conformity check is a physical examination of the aircraft and its records, conducted to
determine if the aircraft is in conformity with FAA regulations for a given status. National Business
Aviation Association, Flight Department Operations,
http://web.nbaa.org/public/ops/faq/cache/294.html (last visited May 12, 2008).
113. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116.49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § 2(c) (2000).
117. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
118. See id.
[Vol. 31:973
2008] Amending the General Aviation Revitalization Act 989
by events not under manufacturer control: (1) whether an "original"" 19
airworthiness certificate specifying less than 20 passenger seats had been
issued to the aircraft prior to the crash and (2) whether the aircraft is en-
gaged in scheduled passenger carriage at the time of the accident. 120 The
Kennedy holding broadened the scope of GARA immunity by absolving
manufacturers from liability for any accident involving one of the thou-
sands of surplus public aircraft now in the civil aviation fleet.
B. Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. is perhaps best known for its
painstakingly thorough opinion regarding GARA's applicability to modi-
fications of an aircraft's systems by the movement of existing parts
within that aircraft. 121 Courts in any jurisdiction facing an issue involv-
ing system modifications under GARA can reasonably be expected to
utilize the Hiser court's exhaustive reasoning in fashioning a decision.
Hiser revolves around a Bell 206L-1 LongRanger helicopter that
crashed when its engine suffered a flame-out in July 1997, eighteen years
and seven days after delivery. 12 2 The plaintiffs theory of the case fo-
cused on faulty fuel flow switches, 123 which had allegedly allowed the
pilot to run out of fuel without notification. As early as 1981, Bell had
received reports of engine flameouts from fuel starvation when fuel still
remained in the aircraft's tanks. 124 These incidents prompted a series of
modifications and additions to the fuel transfer system, including the re-
location of two inline fuel filters, the replacement of the fuel transfer fuel
flow switches, and revised operating procedures. 25 Eventually, these
recommended changes became mandatory for all operators when, at
Bell's request, the FAA issued an AD requiring compliance. 126
After methodically explaining how the LongRanger's fuel transfer
system was designed to work, the court ruled that the plain language of
GARA indicates that the eighteen-year clock should not restart if original
parts are merely moved to new locations within the existing system. In
119. See infra Part IV.C.
120. § 2(c).
121.4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
122. Id. at 252. A flame-out is a failure of a turbine engine caused by an interruption of the fuel
supply or by faulty combustion. TheFreeDictionary, flame-out,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/flame-out (last visited May 12, 2008).
123. Id. at 253. Fuel flow switches (or fuel flow transmitters) are devices used to measure the
amount of fuel flowing within a fuel line. DICTIONARY OF AERONAUTICAL TERMS, supra note 8, at
232.
124. Hiser, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 254.
125. Id.
126. See Airworthiness Directives; Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI), Model 206A, 206B,
206B-1, 206L, 206L-1, and 206L-3 Helicopters, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,953-01 (June 27, 1989).
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other words, a modification to a system, such as moving a fuel flow
transducer to a new location, does not constitute a new or replaced sys-
tem under GARA. 12 7 Moreover, the court held that the replacement of
discrete parts in a system does not constitute a new or replaced system,
even if causes the system to function in a completely different way. 128
The eighteen-year period, therefore, restarts only if new parts are in-
stalled in the aircraft; modifications do not restart the GARA repose pe-
riod, no matter how the original parts are reemployed in the aircraft.
If the Hiser court's interpretation is correct, GARA actively pro-
motes the juggling of parts over the issuance of a repair involving new
parts. This result runs counter to the widely acknowledged public policy
interest in the promotion of safety. The court's reasoning rests on a plain
language analysis of the meaning of "replacement." 129 This analysis,
while literally accurate, ignores the fact that a system's function and de-
sign is new if it is configured in a different way. To illustrate the absurd
implications of the court's decision, consider that currently, a mechanic
may not legally "approve for return to service" 130 any system that is not
configured in accordance with "approved data,"' 131 such as the Manufac-
turer's Maintenance Manual. This rule prevents mechanics from experi-
mentally reconfiguring an aircraft's systems. Thus, the FAA regards a
mechanic's experimental shuffling of parts as an unacceptable reconfigu-
ration because it is not in accordance with the type certificate. 132 Why,
then, should manufacturer-approved reshuffling be acceptable, when the
manufacturer cannot be held liable for injuries that result from its negli-
gent failure to fix an existing problem or its creation of a new hazard?
Under this scenario, a plaintiff would inexplicably be denied the right to
recover for injuries caused by a system that is negligently altered by a
manufacturer after GARA's protection kicks in. The Hiser court did, at
least, acknowledge this possibility, noting that Congress could add modi-
fications to the list of actions that would restart the GARA repose pe-
riod. 133 Plainly, Congress should do so as soon as practicable in order to
eliminate this unjust loophole.
127. Hiser, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. "Approval for return to service" is a term of art utilized by the FAA to signify acknowl-
edgment of properly performed work on an aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.5, .9(a)(4) (2007).
131. "Approved data" is information approved by the FAA and is the only information that
federal regulations allow to be used in maintaining aircraft. DICTIONARY OF AERONAUTICAL TERMS,
supra note 8, at 36.
132. See § 43.13 (requiring that aircraft maintenance be conducted using "methods, techniques,
and practices ... acceptable to the Administrator").
133. Hiser, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257.
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C. Croman Corp. v. GE Co.
The court in Croman Corp. v. GE Co., in the context of a summary
judgment ruling, had the opportunity to examine the meaning, under
GARA, of the term "originally issued," as applied to an airworthiness
certificate. 134 The case involved a Sikorsky S-61A helicopter that lost
power while performing logging operations.13 1 Investigation of the air-
craft's records showed that the helicopter was first certificated in the ex-
perimental category, 136 with no mention made of the aircraft's passenger
capacity. The type certificate data sheet 137 of certain models of the S-61
series of helicopter indicated that some models were approved for the
carriage of more than twenty individuals. 3 8 Later, operators of the air-
craft changed the helicopter's category from experimental to restricted,
adding the express limitation that no passengers were to be flown on the
aircraft. 139
The plaintiffs attacked GE's and Sikorsky's assertion that GARA
protected them from suit, arguing that the helicopter was not a "general
aviation" aircraft according to the statute and that therefore their case
should survive summary judgment. 140 The plaintiffs noted that the air-
craft was initially issued an experimental airworthiness certificate, which
they believed supported their argument that GARA didn't apply, due to
the passenger capacity of the aircraft. 141
The court disagreed, interpreting GARA's "original issuance" pro-
vision to apply to situations in which the aircraft had later been converted
to another category or classification that required a subsequent airwor-
thiness certificate. 142 Therefore, the earliest airworthiness certificate that
brought the aircraft into its current category is the original certificate for
GARA purposes, regardless of how many prior certificates were issued
in other categories.
The Croman plaintiffs also lost their argument that GARA's refer-
ence to "passengers" meant the total number of persons the aircraft could
134. No. 2:05-cv-0575-GEB-JFM, 2006 WL 3201099, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006).
135. Id. at *1.
136. "As used with respect to the certification of aircraft, [category] means a grouping of air-
craft based upon intended use or operating limitations. Examples include: transport, normal, utility,
acrobatic, limited, restricted, and provisional." § 1.1.
137. A type certificate data sheet comprises "[tihe official specifications of an aircraft, engine,
or propeller issued by the Federal Aviation Administration." DICTIONARY OF AERONAUTICAL
TERMS, supra note 8, at 530.
138. Croman, 2006 WL 3201099, at *3-4.
139. Id. at *2.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *3.
142. Id.
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carry, crew included. 143 The court noted that the number of "passengers"
for GARA purposes would be consistent with the FAA's definition,
which does not include required crewmembers.'44 Under GARA, then, a
general aviation aircraft with more than nineteen noncrewmember seats
cannot be certified. 145 The upshot in Croman was the entering of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants. 1
46
It is doubtful whether, at the time of GARA's passage, Congress
understood the subtle distinctions between common sense understand-
ings of terms like "passengers" and "original issuance" and the FAA's
more specialized definitions. In sum, Croman provides one more exam-
ple of product defect victims and their attorneys being forced to struggle
with the application of an unclear and unintuitive law.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Once GARA's flaws are recognized, the question becomes, "What
can be done to correct its shortcomings?" This Part will both examine
problematic areas of GARA that Congress should address in the interest
of equity and recommend specific amendments that will minimize its
deficiencies. Specifically, this Part recommends (1) the exemption of
third party property damage claims from GARA's provisions; (2) the
narrowing of GARA's definition of "general aviation aircraft"; (3) the
inclusion of the issuance date of an aircraft's initial type certificate or
airworthiness certificate in the calculus of whether to grant GARA im-
munity; (4) the implementation of a viable system of determining when a
"used" part is covered by GARA; (5) the provision of notice to pilots and
passengers if their aircraft is covered by GARA; and (6) the restarting of
the repose period upon aircraft system modifications.
A. Third Party Property Damage Claims
Should Be Exempted from GARA Protection
Although GARA's exceptions are generally well thought out, there
is one glaring omission that could lead to great injustice: GARA does not
contain an exception allowing third parties to recover for property dam-
age. 147 Because of this omission, a property owner might have no viable
143. Id. at *4.
144. Id.
145. See id. at *1-5.
146. Id. at *8.
147. Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and Critical Analysis of the New General Aviation Revitaliza-
tion Act, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 385, 414 (1996).
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means of recovery for property damage caused by the crash of a defec-
tive aircraft, merely because the aircraft is over eighteen years old. '
48
The lack of a property damage exception is completely at odds with
common notions of fairness and justice. 149 Equitable principles almost
universally allow for the recovery of damages in situations where a third
party's property is damaged by the negligent acts of another. 150 GARA
allows persons on the ground to recover if they are injured or killed due
to a design or manufacturing defect in a GARA-covered aircraft, yet the
property of these same individuals is mysteriously left unprotected.151
Nothing in the legislative record indicates that Congress intended to bar
property owners from recovering damages for harm to their belongings,
and there is simply no argument or justification for such an outcome.
Third party property claims are typically insubstantial when compared to
claims for wrongful death. Moreover, no manufacturer cited property
damage claims as being a form of liability from which they required re-
lief. Adding third party property damage claims to the list of GARA ex-
ceptions would close a loophole that serves no logical purpose.
B. Amend GARA's Definition of "General Aviation Aircraft"
The congressional hearings preceding the enactment of GARA
make plain that the final language of the statute created a scope of cover-
age that was far broader than its proponents indicated through their tes-
timony. While there is no evidence of intentional misrepresentation on
the part of these witnesses, the general aviation manufacturing industry
got far more benefit at the expense of product liability plaintiffs than
anyone present at the hearings could have reasonably expected. 152 After
the House hearings, the proposed bill was described as "a narrow and
considered response to the 'perceived' liability crisis in the general avia-
tion industry."153 The version of GARA later signed into law, however,
was drafted unreasonably broadly. 154
The Kennedy court's definition of a "general aviation aircraft"
serves as a bellwether for the overbreadth of GARA's scope. 155 The gen-
eral aviation industry may contend that Congress was fully informed
when it enacted GARA, and that the statute expresses the clear intent of
148. See supra Part III.B.
149. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 548 (2005).
150. Id.
151.49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § 2(b)(3) (2000).
152. See supra Part II.C.
153. H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11) (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644 (emphasis
added).
154. See supra Part II.C.
155. See supra Part IV.A.
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that body. But opponents of GARA's overbreadth can rightly rebut this
claim by pointing to the fact that no one offered arguments at the hear-
ings supporting the release of manufacturers from liability regarding tur-
bine-powered, ex-military aircraft. The fact that GARA applies to the
cargo version of Boeing's 747 jumbo jet, if operated as an on-demand
charterer, for example, casts doubt on any industry claim that GARA's
current scope was intended or warranted.
Congress needs to narrow GARA's scope to accurately reflect the
statute's original intent; GARA should cover only piston-powered air-
craft that weigh no more than 12,500 pounds. 156 If Congress believes that
the rest of the aerospace manufacturing community requires relief from
product liability, that issue should be decided on its merits, after open
hearings.
C. The Issuance Date of an Aircraft's Initial
Type Certificate or Airworthiness Certificate
Should Be Included in the Calculus ofAssigning Liability
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kennedy has created a situation in
which an aviation manufacturer has no control over which of its aircraft
will eventually be covered by GARA. 157 In Kennedy, the court ruled that
an aircraft's initial delivery date controlled the running of the repose pe-
riod, irrespective of the existence of a valid airworthiness certificate at
that time.1 58 Adding to the confusion is the indeterminate status of air-
craft rebuilders. Are they manufacturers under GARA? According to the
Kennedy court, they would not be.159 In that case, Bell unsuccessfully
tried to claim that Garlick, not itself, was the legal manufacturer of the
aircraft. 160 Because some rebuilders actually construct a "new" airplane
around an existing data plate, 161 while others merely compile the neces-
sary paperwork for issuance of an airworthiness certificate for a surplus
public aircraft, liability is not accurately apportioned to these "manufac-
turers" according to their likely fault in proximately causing an acci-
dent. 162
156. This weight limit is a rational choice because aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds
cannot generally be legally operated by a pilot not holding a type rating for large aircraft. 14 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1,61.31(a)(1) (2007).
157. See supra Part IV.A.
158. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1109.
161. A data plate is a fireproof plate inscribed with certain FAA-mandated information that is
required to be secured to certificated aircraft and their engines, propellers, and propeller blades. 41
C.F.R. § 102-33.20 (2008).
162. Under Kennedy, a person who "builds" an aircraft around a data plate will never get the
benefit of GARA protection. Thus, GARA does more to protect aircraft "designers" than aircraft
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The confusion created by the Kennedy decision demands resolution.
Part of the problem is GARA's overbreadth. Nevertheless, the issues of
the amount of liability that should rightfully be placed on the certificat-
ing party and how the repose period should be adjusted for aircraft that
have been in service for years before certification are, for now, dormant.
Congress should hold additional hearings on this subject. Open debate
would allow each side to argue its case in a public forum, thus facilitat-
ing a fairer assessment of the interests and consequences surrounding any
proposed amendment of GARA.
D. Create a System to Determine When
a Used Part Is Covered by GARA
The lack of a method of determining the initial installation dates of
the millions of previously installed parts currently flying in aircraft is a
serious flaw in GARA. Beyond those specific aircraft accessories which
generally carry their own individual logs, such as propellers rotors and
engines, 163 there is absolutely no reliable means of determining prior in-
stallation dates of replacement parts, other than by review of the donor
aircrafts' logs, if they can be found. 
164
None of the witnesses testifying regarding the enactment of GARA
anticipated the potential logistical problems that could confront those
trying to determine the running of GARA's repose period for specific
replacement parts. While no case has yet dealt with this issue directly,
the Hiser court's analysis of whether a part or system caused the accident
provides an inkling of the difficulties that lie ahead. Currently, we can
only speculate about what a court might do when faced with the question
of whether GARA forecloses a wrongful death action brought after a re-
placement part of indeterminate installation date has served as the clear
proximate cause of a fatal aircraft crash. Assuming that a factual pre-
dicament of this nature would survive summary judgment and go to the
jury, it would, nonetheless, prove impossible for a plaintiff to sustain his
or her burden of proof due to the lack of a uniform system tracking the
"builders." Experimental aircraft builders, however, should receive GARA protection (if they are
named as the manufacturers on the data plate) that companies specializing in producing experimental
designs and kits might not. Currently, it is not clear whether aircraft kit suppliers will qualify for
GARA protection as parts manufacturers because their parts are not certified as "aircraft parts" prior
to certification of the finished aircraft.
163. Engines, propellers, rotors, and appliances are required to have maintenance, preventative
maintenance, and alterations recorded in a log. 14 C.F.R. § 91.417 (2008). In the author's experi-
ence, aircraft owners typically maintain separate logs for, at a minimum, engines, rotors, and propel-
lers.
164. Though certain life-limited parts must have tracking documentation regarding certain
aspects of their service history, data regarding initial installation date is generally not required. See
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first installation date of used parts. The plaintiff would be denied justly
deserved relief because of a logistical flaw in the system underlying the
statute.
Two obvious potential solutions to this problem are (1) restarting
the repose period for the part itself when it is replaced or (2) requiring
mandatory tracking of all aircraft parts. Conceivably, such a system
could be implemented by including with every replacement part a track-
ing document that both lists the particulars of every installation and re-
moval and follows the part until it is scrapped. Functionally, this would
be the equivalent of requiring the establishment and maintenance of a log
for every part removed or installed on an aircraft. Understandably, both
of these solutions are far from ideal. Mandatory tracking would place a
huge financial and logistical burden on the entire aviation community
and would, therefore, likely be resisted by all of its members.
A less burdensome alternative would entail documenting part in-
stallation dates only as they are removed from the original aircraft. This
option would reduce both paperwork and labor while solving the first
installation date problem. Unfortunately, the lack of an adequate tracking
procedure regarding parts that that are already in the system is a problem
that will likely remain unsolved, regardless of which tracking method is
ultimately selected. 165 With respect to such parts, an adequate tracking
method may prove unobtainable.
E. Notice Should Be Provided to Pilots and
Passengers if an Aircraft Is Protected by GARA
Currently, after an aircraft accident, injured passengers or pilots, for
example, might discover that their otherwise valid claims against the air-
craft's manufacturer are barred by GARA only upon the dismissal of
their complaints. Passengers and pilots should be notified much earlier of
GARA's limitation on liability. Passengers on commercial flights, for
example, are given notice on their tickets if their potential accident re-
coveries are limited by the Warsaw 166 or Montreal 167 conventions. Also,
federal regulations require owners of experimental aircraft to conspicu-
ously post the fact that these aircraft do not comply with federal safety
165. To reduce the potential administrative burden, the tracking requirement might take effect
only as parts are removed from their original aircraft.
166. The Warsaw Convention is an international convention regulating liability in the area of
for-profit international carriage of persons, luggage, or goods by aircraft. Wikipedia, Warsaw Con-
vention, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki[Warsaw Convention (last visited May 12, 2008).
167. The Montreal Convention is a treaty, adopted in 1999, amending certain provisions of the
Warsaw Convention concerning compensation for air disaster victims. Wikipedia, Montreal Conven-
tion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MontrealConvention (last visited May 12, 2008).
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regulations. 168 There is no reason not to warn occupants of any aircraft
subject to GARA that their ability to recover damages may be severely
limited. One cannot fairly expect a nonexpert passenger to determine the
age of an aircraft in which he or she rides, and the consequent legal risk
of nonrecovery in the event of injury, purely on the aircraft's general ap-
pearance. 1
69
One plausible solution to this problem is a requirement that a plac-
ard be conspicuously posted on the aircraft on or before its "eighteenth
birthday." This placard could be affixed without a determination of
whether GARA actually protects that particular aircraft. Instead, the
placard could simply indicate that GARA will limit recovery when the
statute's conditions are met. The placard would place aircraft occupants
on notice, thus allowing them to determine the actual GARA status of
that particular aircraft on their own volition.
One benefit that a GARA placard could provide to manufacturers is
the stimulation of greater demand for newer products, due to a perceived
loss of value regarding older aircraft. If owners, pilots, and passengers of
older aircraft were clearly presented with the potentiality of an automatic
"release of liability" under GARA, newer aircraft should become more
attractive to the buying and flying public. In addition, the expense of
such a program would be minimal-merely the cost of installing the
placard, perhaps near the requisite display pouch containing the aircraft's
airworthiness certificate. This installation could easily be incorporated
into the annual inspection checklist 7° of any aircraft seventeen years or
older.
While some may argue that this change would be inconsequential to
the behavior of the flying public, such an argument is logically flawed.
An empirical observation that most small aircraft passengers will not turn
down a ride in an experimental aircraft would not effectively support an
argument that experimental aircraft should not be conspicuously identi-
fied as such. Members of the public deserve notification of the potential
GARA bar on recovery in the event they are injured by a defect in the
aircraft in which they are about to fly.
168. See 14 C.F.R. § 45.23(b) (2007) (requiring posted notice in letters no smaller than two
inches near the cockpit entrance).
169. The maxim that a new paint job hides a multitude of sins holds true for aircraft. Many
aircraft have been in production, relatively unchanged, for decades. New paint, or a more recent
color scheme, can easily hide the true age of an aircraft. Ladd Sanger, Note, Will the General A via-
tion Revitalization Act of 1994 Allow the Industry to Fly High Once Again?, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 435, 463-64 (1995) (arguing that the statute is problematic from the perspective of informed
consent because it is difficult for a passenger to determine whether the aircraft he or she is traveling
in is covered by GARA).
170. In general, no person may operate an aircraft unless it has had an annual inspection within
the previous year that meets federal guidelines. § 91.409(a)(1).
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F. System Modifications Should Restart the Repose Period
The Hiser court's ruling that system modifications do not restart the
repose period is one of the most blatant examples of an unjust judicial
interpretation of GARA. The court passed responsibility for its decision
on to Congress:
Had Congress wished to draft GARA to cover the circumstances
urged by plaintiff, it could easily have written the rolling statute of
repose to commence anew whenever a component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part is replaced or modified, provided that the re-
placed or modified component, system, subassembly, or other part
caused the alleged damage. 171
If Congress amended GARA to allow for rolling of the repose pe-
riod for modified systems, manufacturers would lose the incentive to
produce fixes that only involve the relocation of existing parts. Encour-
aging manufacturers to experiment with aircraft systems solely by mov-
ing parts, with no concomitant liability, is not in the public interest.
The fact that all systems must survive eighteen years at a minimum
before manufacturers are immunized should provide a sufficient incen-
tive to motivate manufacturers to initiate fixes. For aircraft systems al-
ready beyond the eighteen-year mark, the misrepresentation/concealment
exception should dissuade manufacturers from knowingly ignoring de-
fective systems out of fear of removing GARA's protection for them. 172
In addition, an amendment to GARA providing for a rolling repose pe-
riod for relocated parts would not create an incentive to leave substan-
dard systems in an unsafe condition. Federal regulations impose a duty
on manufacturers to report to the FAA serious failures, malfunctions, and
defects in any product they manufacture. 173
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress passed GARA, it created a law with such vague
and ambiguous language that any court would be hard pressed to divine
its original intent from the statute's wording alone. The interpretation of
GARA has inequitably burdened a small class of victims. Manufacturers
now enjoy almost total immunity from suit for whole classes of air-
craft--classes to which Congress never intended GARA to apply. Con-
gress must shoulder most of the blame for this situation, for two reasons.
First, based on the legislative history, it is abundantly clear that GARA
171. Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 257 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
172. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § 2(b)(1) (2000).
173. 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 (2008) (generally requiring such reporting within twenty-four hours of
discovery).
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was sold to Congress as a way to save the U.S. piston-powered, single-
engine aircraft market, its attendant job base, and the flight training mar-
ket that surrounds it-not to subsidize manufacturers of military aircraft
or business jets. Second, our courts should not be forced to make results-
oriented decisions in order to avoid the inequities of a poorly drafted law.
Reasonable interpretations of statutory language that lead to injustice
signal that the statute may be the problem. Legislators cannot anticipate
every possibility, and sometimes they just get it wrong. In this case,
lawmakers have a duty to correct the injuries promulgated by their pens.
Statutes of repose like GARA serve a valuable purpose: they pro-
tect manufacturers from being held to unreasonable standards of liability,
and they prevent in terrorem settlements grounded on frivolous claims.
But the unintended consequences that flow from judicial interpretation of
vague statutory language can pose a serious threat to the equitable ad-
ministration of justice. The individuals wronged by these questionable
extensions of GARA should not be written off as unfortunate casualties,
justified by the greater good of some utilitarian calculus. When a system
of justice has demonstrable faults that lead to injustice for certain groups,
it is the duty of those working within that system to alleviate those ineq-
uities to the maximum extent possible. Congress must take a hard look at
GARA and amend it, in the interest of justice.
